"Information Espionage with Asymmetric Spying Ability" [PDF]
Can being spied upon benefit a firm? The answer depends on the nature of competition and the type of information being stolen, as this paper shows. If competitors are tapping into each other's private signal about demand, then more precise spying is profit-enhancing under price competition (always) and quantity competition (if the spying signal is more precise than the private signal). Interestingly, in the latter case the firms would not like to share their demand information voluntarily (Vives, 1984). Hence, industrial espionage becomes the principal channel of profit-increasing information transmission.
"A Representation Theorem for Guilt Aversion" (with Martin Kaae Jensen) [PDF] - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 125 (2016): 148-161.
Guilt aversion has been shown to play an important role in economic decision-making. In this paper, we take an axiomatic approach to guilt by deducing a utility representation from a list of easily interpretable assumptions on an agent's preferences. It turns out that our logarithmic representation can mitigate the problem of multiplicity of equilibria to which psychological games are prone. We apply the model in three well-known games and show that its predictions are consistent with experimental observations.
"Cooperation by Strategically Sophisticated Players" - available at SSRN
In an experiment on finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (hereafter FRPD), subjects who best-respond to a computer algorithm are also more cooperative when playing against other human players. The difference in cooperation rates increases as the subjects gain experience with the game. As a result, sophisticated players earn more than naifs, when paired with players of their own type.
End-Effect and Fairness In Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms and Preference for Reciprocity (with Antonio Nicolo)
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Market Games (with Indrajit Ray)
A Simple Concave Utility when One Commodity is a Bad